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Anti-Psychologism and Neutrality
The Radical Empiricism of Husserl and James
Roberta Lanfredini
 
I. Anti-Psychologism and Anti-Realism in Husserl
1 As  is  well  known,  Husserl’s  criticism  of  psychologism  is  unreserved.  Psychologism,
understood as a tendency to attribute any claim of rational validity to the structure of the
human psyche, or to its biological and psychic base, confines logic entirely to psychology.
Following psychologism’s reasoning to its extremes, we would have to acknowledge that
the distinction between rational thought and judgement depends only on the psychic
constitution which, de facto, characterises us. This means that if this constitution were
different, we would have other forms of reasoning and would even perceive in another
way than we do. In short, we would live in a different world. From such a perspective,
justifying a logical principle means understanding mental processes which occur when it
is thought: for example, the principle of contradiction would not express the condition of
possibility of any true utterance, but a psychological impossibility. We cannot believe two
contradictory things at the same time, simply because two opposed belief-acts cannot
coexist  in  our  mind.1 The  cogency  of  the  principle  of  non-contradiction  would  not
therefore reside in a presumed absolute validity, but in a factual impossibility, due to a
certain structure or mental  constitution,  of  thinking otherwise.  To the extent that it
reduces the validity of concepts to the subject’s bio-psychic structure, psychologism is
also inevitably subjectivism and relativism: to say that something is true in relation to a
biological or psychic structure means admitting that this something could not be true for
someone endowed with a different structure. In the end, psychologism is scepticism: if
nothing exists but points of view determined by different de facto constitutions, there will
be no objective point of view. Now, for Husserl, the basic error of psychologism is that of
deducing logical principles from facts. Psychologism, as a form of scepticism, is not only
false for Husserl, but absurd. In fact, it
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makes the assertion: anything is true for a given species of judging beings that, by
their constitution and laws of thought, must count as true. This doctrine is absurd.
For it is part of its sense that the same proposition or content of judgment can be
true for a subject of the species homo,  but may be false for another subject of a
differently constituted species. The same content of judgement cannot, however, be
both true and false: this follows from the mere sense of “true” and “false.” If the
relativist gives these words their appropriate meaning, his thesis is in conflict with
its own sense. (Husserl 1899-1900a/1973: 79) 
2 So, psychologism misunderstands the very meaning of the term, “truth,” since this term
does not allude to a subjective belief but to an objective validity. The absurdity into which
it runs could be rendered as an assertion of the type, “it is true that there is no such thing
as truth.” The declaration of scepticism’s absurdity is linked to another absurdity: that of
the  thing  in  itself.  For  Husserl  (and  for  Kant  before  him),  this  is  neither  syntactical
nonsense nor semantic nonsense. Speaking of an absolutely independent and objective
thing, is not in fact contradictory. The thing in itself does not even express a material
self-contradiction: speaking of a thing in itself is not like speaking of a colour without
extension. According to Husserl, the thing in itself expresses a formal self-contradiction,
something like a round square. The reason would reside in the fact that the expression
“in itself” contradicts the expression “thing”: in other words, the notion of thing in itself
contains  determinations  which  challenge  one  another  irreconcilably.  The  self-
contradiction would be something like a world outside of our world; and yet, on a closer
view, a world outside our world is not only, as Husserl admits, different from a thing that
is simultaneously green and not green (which in this case would sound like something of
the type world not-world); but also – in contradiction to what Husserl maintains – from
round square (something like real-appearance). The fact that we are talking about a further
type of self-contradiction is indicated by the word outside associated with the word our, in
the assertion “a world outside of our world.”
The hypothetical assumption of  something real  outside this  world is,  of  course,
“logically” possible; obviously it involves no formal contradiction. But when we ask
about the essential conditions on which its validity would depend, about the mode
of  demonstration  taken  universally  essentially  determined  by  the  positing  of
something transcendent […] we recognize that something transcendent necessarily
must  be  experienceable not  merely  by  an  Ego  conceived  as  an  empty  logical
possibility  but  by  any  actual Ego  as  a  demonstrable  unity  relative  to  its
concatenations of experiences. (Husserl 1913/83: 108)
3 Referring to a world outside our world, and so to the thing in itself, does not entail the
violation either of the material ontological law according to which two genera that are
founded in experience, become separated from each other (as in the case of colour and
extension), or of the formal ontological law which states that two disconnected species
cannot live together within the same singularity (as in the case of square and round). In
the case of the thing in itself, we are witnessing the violation of a further, and in a certain
sense, prior law: the law according to which the notion of thing necessarily refers back to a
lived experience. Note: reference to, not belonging to. Indeed, red does not contain the
sensation  of  red  and  conversely,  the  sensation  of  red  does  not  contain  red  as  its
constituent part. Nevertheless, red refers back to the sensation of red, just as the red
house  refers  back  to  the  perception  of  the  red  house.  The  ontological-material self-
contradiction  (colour  without  extension)  and  the  ontological-formal self-contradiction
(round-square) make reference to the bondedness in force between the non-independent
parts of the thing: foundation in the first case (colour and extension are genera founded
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on one another) and inclusion in the second (two species belonging concretely to the
same  genus  become  disconnected).  The  expression  ‘thing  in  itself’  expresses  a  self-
contradiction which we could call formal-constitutive.  This is a self-contradiction which
appeals not so much to the internal structure of the thing, so much as to its necessary
link  –  in  that  it  is  a  thing  –  to  an  experience.  The  thing  in  itself is  therefore  self-
contradictory because it  makes reference to something that  contains the reference to
consciousness while at the same time withdrawing from it: it is simply not something. If
the two concepts of object and experience are separate genera linked by a relationship of
unilateral foundation,2 the notion of thing in itself represents a violation of this type of
foundation.
4 The  necessary  link  between  object  and  experience  guarantees  neutrality  to
phenomenology and at the same time ensures that it renders psychologism obsolete. In
Husserl, these two concepts, of neutrality and anti-psychologism, go hand in hand. In
fact, anti-psychologism is an immediate consequence of the work of neutralization (or of
reduction, suspension, modification, epoché, placed in brackets: all of these terms being
considered  synonyms by  Husserl)  which  allows  phenomenology  to  convert  into
phenomenological and eidetic giveness all that is given naturally (or naturalistically) as a
de  facto datum.  This  conversion  also  concerns  concrete  psychic  activity:  from being
empirical,  it  becomes  transformed  into  structures  of  eidetic  consciousness.  What
phenomenology  aims  at  is  not  so  much the  individual  consciousness  as  its  essential
structure. Descriptive analysis of the states of consciousness does not mean investigation
of  the  psycho-physical  causes  which  determine  the  origin  of  our  experiences.
Phenomenology does not describe the experience as rooted in a particular organism in a
determined situation,  nor  is  it  concerned with psychological  regularities  founded on
human  nature  (as  was  the  case  in  Hume,  for  example);  it  does  not  consider  the
psychological genesis or the organic origin of lived experience as being within its remit.
What  phenomenology  offers  is  a  pure analysis  of  consciousness,  which  satisfies  two
conditions:  investigating the  internal structure  of  experiences  and investigating  their
invariant,  or  essential,  structure.  The  search  for  invariance  therefore  extends  to  all
phenomena, including experiences. On the other hand, conceiving of phenomenology as
the investigation of  essences  does  not  deny the absolute priority  of  subjectivity:  the
invariant structures of experience and of the objects which reveal themselves in such
experience are structures of subjectivity, or rather are constituted by subjectivity, not
structures which the objects would exhibit  in themselves and for themselves.  In this
sense,  phenomenology  proposes  itself  as  a  transcendental  investigation:  the  objects
towards which the experiences of consciousness are intentionally directed always and
necessarily pertain to subjectivity. Any reference to entities that are not the result of
such a constitution must be “neutralized” by the phenomenological method, using the
instrument of the epoché, whose purpose is to put belief in the effective existence of the
world in brackets. This permits an interruption of the naïve adherence to reality which
marks natural behaviour, that same adherence which is then reversed in the naturally (or
naturalistically) oriented positive sciences.
 
II. Which Neutrality?
5 Every phenomenon necessarily refers back to an experience. The latter must nevertheless
be interpreted not as a psychic phenomenon, but as an eidetic phenomenology; that is, as
Anti-Psychologism and Neutrality
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
3
having a structure that is not psychological and individual, but essential and universal.
These two assertions enclose the idea of  phenomenology as a science of  experiences
which is as the same time anti-psychologist and neutral. Hence, the notion of neutrality
reaffirms the link with the operations of subjectivity, albeit transformed eidetically. Now,
it is exactly the notion of neutrality which is de-activated by James, in favor of an almost
inverted interpretation of this concept. The result will be a conception radically different
from anti-psychologism, which is nevertheless maintained within the sphere of a “pure”
description of experience, of what we could without hesitation call a phenomenological
description.
6 Both Husserl and James, therefore, identify neutrality as the way to realize that “radical
standing  by  experience”  (James  1907/96:  23),  which  distinguishes  a  radical  (and
sophisticated) empiricism. The problem is that the notion of neutrality has by no means
the same meaning for one as it does for the other. For Husserl, as we have seen, adopting
a neutral stance means maintaining a transcendental system, the keys of which are as
follows:  constitution,  noesis,  content,  intentional  structure.  In  other  words,  an
asymmetrical structure which, declaring the priority of the noetic pole over the noematic,
at the same time asserts the priority of the cognitive stance. Neutralization, understood
as suspension, modification, or bracketing, is therefore substantially directed towards
natural behavior with a view to asserting the fundamentality of the subjective pole over
the objectival one. For James, adopting a neutral stance means, on the contrary, not so
much reducing or modifying the natural world, or putting it in brackets, as adopting a
methodological  stance  of  symmetry  and  equidistance.  So  for  James,  contra Husserl,
neutrality  entails  the  obsolescence  of  two  theses:  the  first  is  the  thesis  of  the
consciousness “as an ‘epistemological’ necessity” (James 1907/96: 7), which gives absolute
priority to the gnoseological stance (“‘Consciousness’ is supposed necessary to explain
the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known” James 1907/96: 6), the
second  is  the  thesis  of  the  phenomenological  necessity  of  reflection,  understood  as
immanent intentionality,  which Husserl  considers necessary to guarantee the – so to
speak – retroactive mechanism of neutralization. Reflection is assimilated by James to a
thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the ‘content’ of
experience is known. It loses personal form and activity – these passing over to the
content – becomes a bare Bewusstheit or Bewusstsein überhaupt, of which in its own
right absolutely nothing can be said. I believe that ‘consciousness,’ when once it has
evaporated  to  this  estate  of  pure  diaphaneity, is  on  the  point  of  disappearing
altogether […]. The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to
see  what, distinctly  it  seems to  vanish.  It  seems as  if  we had before  us  a  mere
emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the
blue; the other element is as if it were diaphanous. (James 1907/96: 6-8)
7 “Ghostly condition,” “diaphaneity,” “pure echo,” “feeble noise,” “a kind of impalpable
inner flowing” (James 1907/96: 8): all these expressions are potentially directed towards
Husserl’s  reflective system,  in an attempt to diminish its  efficacy and its  descriptive
artificiality: “we are supposed by almost every one to have an immediate consciousness of
consciousness itself” (James 1907/96: 7); “if you abstract the content, the consciousness
will remain revealed to its own eye” (James 1907/96: 8). 
8 For James, a pragmatist (or neutral) methodology has the aim of challenging both the
predominance of knowledge and the efficacy of reflection: in other words, the two pillars
of Husserl’s asymmetrical system. The result is the identification of a totally equidistant
and impersonal terrain in which pure experience dwells:
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My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff
or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that
stuff ‘pure experience,’ then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of
relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter.
The relation itself  is  a  part  of  pure experience;  one of  its  “terms” becomes the
subject  or  bearer  of  the  knowledge,  the  knower,  the  other  becomes  the  object
known. (James 1907/96: 7)
9 The  goal  is  a  dualism  that  is  no  longer  bipolar  (ie.  expressed  in  the  asymmetry  of
experience-phenomenon,  consciousness-datum)  but  unipolar (expressing  itself  in  the
ontological  indifference of  the terms “thought,” “thing,” or “idea,” as understood by
classical  empiricist  tradition;  a  “unipolar  dualism”3 in  which the distinction between
consciousness and “content” (in the sense of  intended phenomenon) is  not  given by
subtraction (as in Husserl), but by addition.4 Proceeding by addition means adopting the
perspective of a neutral but dual monism, within which experience takes on the likeness
of subjective or objectival experience, according to the context into which it happens to
be inserted. Thought and thing, consciousness and phenomenon, noesis and noema (to
use Husserl’s terminology) are therefore not ontologically but functionally distinct: in other
words, the distinction between them does not depend on internal but external factors; that
is, on being inserted into different relational contexts. This allows experience to assume a
sort  of  interchangeability  which  alone  is  able  to  satisfy  fully  the  requirement  of
“neutrality.” The idea is this: there exists a pure experience, an instantaneous present, a
simple, unqualified actuality or existence, a pure this which is only virtually or potentially
both object and subject. This “naïve” immediacy is there, and we carry out our action in
it, “and the doubling of it in retrospection into a state of mind and a reality intended
thereby, is just one of the acts. The ‘state of mind,’  first treated explicitly as such in
retrospection, will stand corrected or confirmed, and the retrospective experience in its
turn will get a similar treatment; but the immediate experience in its passing is always
‘truth,’ practical truth, something to act on, at its own movement” (James 1907/96: 12-3).
Thus, the puzzle of how an identical room can be in two places (in my living in it as a
physical place, and in my thinking about it), to cite a famous example by James, is solved
by conceiving of the room as the place of intersection “of two processes, which connected
it with different groups of associates respectively” (James 1907/96: 9): on the one hand
the “subjective” biography of the house, and on the other, its “objective” history of which
the room is a part. Concrete experience, “this here,” is nothing but the terminus ad quem
of  a  series  of  mental  states,  sensations,  perceptions,  emotions,  expectations,  and the
terminus a quo of a series of possible “internal states” directed towards the future; but it is
also the terminus ad quem of a succession of physical operations, such as flooring, painting,
furnishing, heating, wallpapering, and the terminus a quo of possible concrete operations.
Now, as James himself acknowledges,
The physical and the mental operations form curiously incompatible groups. As a
room, the experience has occupied that spot and had that environment for thirty
years.  As your field of  consciousness it  may never have existed until  now. As a
room, attention will go on to discover endless new details in it. As your mental state
merely, few new ones will emerge under attention’s eye. As a room, it will take an
earthquake, or a gang of men, and in any case a certain amount of time, to destroy
it. As your subjective state, the closing of your eyes, or any instantaneous play of
your fancy will suffice. In the real world, fire will consume it. In your mind, you can
let fire play over it  without effect.  As an outer object,  you must pay so much a
month to inhabit it. As an inner content, you may occupy it for any length of time
rent-free. (James 1907/96: 9)
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10 The neutral stance therefore consists in acknowledging the full legitimacy of different
lines of order (James 1907/96:10); which, from the chaos of primal experiences, 5 enables
the experience itself  to be structured,  albeit  in “curiously incompatible” ways (some
passages possess the the curious stubbornness […] of fact,” others “the fluidity of fancy”
(James 1907/96: 12), giving rise to “experienced relationships” (James 1907/96: 12n10) to
different domains (or regions, to use a Husserlian term).6 These are structural chains
which organize experience,  giving it  meaning and continuity,  starting from a primal
chaos,7 according to an order, both spatial and temporal, which renders actual experience
(the here, the now) congruent in relation to the inactual horizons, both spatial (“there,”
“up there,” “down there,” etc.) and temporal (“then,” “before,” etc.), thereby offering
continuity and stability to experience. By doing this, the thing in James undergoes a sort
of “doubling up” (James 1907/96: 12), wholly absent in Husserl, according to the line of
order in which it becomes inserted, “and all this without paradox or mystery, just as the
same material thing may be both low and high, or small and great, or bad and good,
because of its relations to opposite parts” (James 1907/96: 12-3). Subjective and objective
thus  become  “functional  attributes” (James  1907/96:  12),  which  make  it  possible  to
consider experience twice, according to the context in which it is inserted. From this
point of view, consciousness does not connote an internal (or constitutive) relationship,
but an external relationship. Or if we like, experience is not consciousness for James, or is
not only consciousness. On the other hand, consciousness, “connotes a kind of external
relation” (James 1907/96: 13) and not a particular “stuff”: “But thoughts in the concrete are
made of the same stuff as things are” (James 1907/96: 17; original emphasis).
 
III. Pure Experience and Distinctio Rationis 
11 However, there are at least two important theoretical points which Husserl and James to
share. The first is the absolute priority of the actuality of the here and now over the
spatial and temporal background (or inactual horizon). The second, closely connected to
the first, is the conception of the object of experience as capable of being broken down
into parts: that is, the tacit adoption of a distinctio rationis. With regard to the first point,
for  Husserl  “consciousness  is  nothing  without  impression”  (Husserl  1893-1917/91:
Appendix I, 163). If it is true that in time as it is experienced every point-now becomes
always and necessarily meditated by retention, it is also true there is no retention that is
not rooted in a now. The primal impression, the present,  the now, are the necessary
fulcrum without which duration cannot unfold. In Husserl, therefore, we can certainly
speak of the primacy of impressional consciousness, or of the datum.
12 Similarly, for James
The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the “pure” experience. It is
only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is
plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that. In this naïf immediacy it is of
course valid; it is there, we act upon it […] Consciousness connotes a kind of external
relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. (James 1907/96: 12-3)
13 The present,  whether directly  connected to action,  as  in James,  or  connected to the
notion of evidence, as in Husserl, remains for both the pivot from which the lines of order
(James)  and the  inactual  horizon  (Husserl)  radiate.  For  this  reason,  the  present  (or
presentification)  maintains  for  both an absolutely  crucial  and fundamental  role.  The
centrality of the now, or the here, is also what enables both to conceive of experience as
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partly  articulable.  For  Husserl,  the priority  (inherited simultaneously  from scholastic
tradition and from empiricism) of the notion of part is sanctioned by the adoption of the
principle of the distinctio rationis; a principle which, in the case of the distinction between
mind and body, is transformed into a distinctio realis or, as Husserl says, into a distinctio
phenomenological (Husserl 1910-11/2006). 
14 In principle,  and precisely because they are essences,  the essence of cogitatio and the
essence of extensio have nothing to do with each other. In the essence of a pain or a
pleasure, for example, there is absolutely no given relationship to a thing. For Husserl
then, if this is the case, we can cut through the empirical relation between cogitatio and
res, without thereby making an abstraction in the sense of Hume’s distinctio realis: that is,
in the sense of a distinction between essentially dependant and inseparable moments of a
concretum. In this case too, Husserl’s anti-psychologism does not only not deny, but in fact
confirms the thesis of an absolute priority of consciousness. If the connection between
experience  and the  person who possesses  that  experience  is,  ontologically  speaking,
contingent, the separation between consciousness and body is essential (which is why,
without  self-contradiction,  we can,  so  to  speak,  cut  the  empirical  bond between the
experience and any existent thing, thereby making a certain “distinctio phenomenological,”
Husserl  1910-11/2006:  §13).  In  other  words,  the  fact  that  it  may  be  impossible  to
distinguish between experience and body does not rule out the essential possibility of
their  separation.  It  is  precisely  in  this  that  difference  between distinctio  rationis and
distinctio phenomenologica exists: the former concerns essentially separable moments (eg.
color  and extension in  a  sensible  whole);  the  second,  essentially  separable  moments
(experiences and consciousness can be conceived of independently from their empirical
relationship with a body).
15 James’s perspective is founded as much as Husserl’s on the ontological notion of part: for
James, thought and thing are much more similar than they may at first appear, precisely
by virtue of the fact that “both may have parts […] and both may be complex or simple.
Both are of kinds, can be compared, added and subtracted and arranged in serial orders”
(James 1907/96: 14). If Husserl’s mereological system attributes priority to the notion of
part in relation to the notion of whole,  the radical empiricism of James considers the
notion of part to be secondary, in favour of the notion of relationship between parts. For the
former, the thing of experience is, at least as far as the phenomenologico-static system is
concerned, the fruit of foundational relationships between non-independent parts which
give origin to wholes; for the latter, the thing of experience is given by the relational
context in which the pure experiences are inserted. Nevertheless, what they share is the
method of distinction or disjunction into – so to speak – “final” parts, whether these are
non-independent,  as  in  the  case  of  Husserl,  or  independent  –  albeit  neutral  and
expression of a “the materia prima of everything” (James 1907/96: 54), as in the case of
James.
16 Husserl states:
There belongs to the essence of extension the ideal possibility of fragmentation. It
is then evident that every fragmentation of the extension fragments the thing itself
– i.e., splits it into pieces, each of which once again has the full thingly character,
that of material thingness. (Husserl 1912/29: 33)
17 And James echoes him: 
Empiricism  […]  lays  the  explanatory  stress  upon  the  part,  the  element,  the
individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction.
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My description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of the whole.
(James 1907/96: 19-20)
18 Now, these shared traits (priority of the present and indispensability of the notion of
part) are at risk of throwing out not only the phenomenological neutrality of “things
themselves,” but also Jamesian neutrality from that level of experience from which it
claims not to detach itself. In other words, the principle of distinctio rationis, united to that
of  presentification,  seems  to  deprive  not  only  phenomenology,  but  also  James’s
empiricism, of that radicalness and “purity” which in both cases constitutes an essential
value. These principles in fact underlie a distancing, an inclination towards fixity which
ends  up  freezing  and  (in  James’s  eyes,  unexpectedly)  rendering  “diaphanous”  and
“spectral” the primal flow of experience, the sole and effective terrain of neutrality. In
this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Husserl could apply with equal validity to James.
For Merleau-Ponty,  the reduction performed by phenomenological  reflection ends up
sapping the fullness of consciousness until it becomes disembodied, merely functional
consciousness:
[t]o  return  to  things  themselves  is  to  return  to  that  world  which  precedes
knowledge,  of  which  knowledge  always  speaks,  and  in  relation  to  which  every
scientific  schematization  is  an  abstract  and  derivative  sign-language,  as  is
geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt beforehand what
a forest, a prairie or a river is. (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002: ix-x)
19 With regard to the “living” territory in which we are immersed, both phenomenological
reduction and the “functionalism” of James act as a map or chart, distancing us inevitably
from the level of pure experience. “Fixity” and “fragmentation” are by no means original,
but derived; they are products of that reflective style or “overview” which Merleau-Ponty
traces in Husserl, but which I think it is also possible to detect in James. Presentification
and “fragmentation” of experience do not express either a neutral stance or a radical
empiricism;  but  they  are  endowed with  a  precise  psychological stance,  which is  then
structured into a theory, aimed less at an effective adhesion to experience than to a grasp
or domination of it. Merleau-Ponty’s question is indeed radical. Philosophy, he writes,
asks of our experience of the world what the world is before it is a thing one speaks
of  and  which  is  taken  for  granted,  before  it  has  been  reduced  to  a  set  of
manageable, disposable significations; it directs this question to our mute life, it
addresses  itself  to  that  compound  of  the  world  and  of  ourselves  that  precedes
reflection, because the examination of the significations in themselves would give
us  the  world  reduced  to  our  idealizations  and  our  syntax.  (Merleau-Ponty
1964/2004: 102)
20 To some extent, both Husserl and James seem to have avoided this question, although
there are certainly some important hints in the two authors which move in this direction.
As far as Husserl is concerned, the concept which perhaps most expresses the historicity
and non-fragmentedness of the flow of experience is that of motivation, together with
passive synthesis. Experience, for Husserl, is always manifested in a chain of motivations.
This thesis constitutes a further argument against the thing in itself: indeed, precisely by
being in itself, the thing withdraws from the uninterrupted flow (which, for Husserl, has
no beginning and no end) of experiences and of their reciprocal nesting, or even their
disconnection  from  one  another,  as  happens  in  illusion,  or  even  more  radically,  in
hallucination. The thing in itself becomes unknowable and ungraspable precisely because
it is not inserted into that motivational flux which renders experience naturally coherent
and dependable, and only in certain cases (when motivation breaks down) deceptive; a
flux which, however it comes into being, constitutes the only thing we have: 
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[i]t must always be born in mind here that whatever physical things are – the only
physical things about which we can make statements, the only ones about the being
or not being, the being thus or being otherwise, of which we can disagree and make
rational decisions, they are as experienceable physical things. It is experience alone
that prescribes their sense; and, since we are speaking of physical things in fact, it
is  actual  experience  alone  which  does  so  in  its  definitely  ordered  experiential
concatenations. (Husserl 1913/83: 106)8
21 What  stands  behind  the  notion  of  motivation  is  the  idea  of  thing  as  invariance  in
variations,  referent  to  an  indefinite  progression  of  prospective  modifications  or
convergent points of view which, precisely because they are convergent, allow the thing
to maintain stability and identity. The notion of experience, in other words, contains with
in itself an invariant structure of a type that is not so much (or not only) categorical
(based on judgment), as principally motivational (perceptual). The transcendence of the
object is thus guaranteed, from the phenomenological point of view, by the connections
which  experience  manifests  and  by  the  perceptual  coherence  which  results  from it.
Furthermore, the notion of motivation is valid in general: indeed, for the thing to be given,
it is not so much necessary to isolate certain privileged and preferential motivational
links, as specifically to sanction the existence in general of some motivational link. Once
again, the notion of thing in itself highlights an impossibility: in this case, the epistemic
impossibility of the thing that withdraws itself in principle from the motivational flux of
experience.  Similar  elements  are  obviously  also  traceable  in  James,  firstly  in  the
centrality  of  the  notion of  flux  of  consciousness.  Nevertheless,  neither  notion,  that  of
motivation and that of flux, rules out the possibility, indeed the necessity, of a fixing and
a segmentation.
 
IV. Radical Empiricism and Modification
22 A possible alternative way forward consists in identifying, with respect to the material
and  mental  (or  representational)  dimensions,  not  a  distinction  but  a  relationship  of
modification, in the sense that the latter can be conceived as a variation of the former.
The almost oxymoronic expressions used by Merleau-Ponty, such as embodied mind, res
viva,  and  flesh  as  “masse  intérieurement  travaillée,” delineate  a  further  concept  of
neutrality,  founded  less  on  the  notion  of  determinative  attribution  than  on  that  of
modifying attribution. An embodied mind, a res viva, and a tormented matter are no longer
in  an  authentic  sense  mind,  res,  matter,  but  something  else.  If  we  interpret  these
expressions in an attributive sense, there subsists a distinction – or, in the most extreme
cases, a separation – between the mental and material dimensions. In the case where the
expressions are instead interpreted as modifying, what occurs is a sort of ontological co-
penetration capable of abandoning the static notion of part in favor of dynamic notions
like those of tendency, force, friction, resistance. Based on what has been said thus far, it
is possible to identify two meanings of invariance: an invariance in variation,  which is
static,  and  in  which  the  notions  of  datum,  determination  and  categorization  play  a
fundamental role; and an invariance in transformation, which is evolutionary, more in tune
with  the  variability  and  flexibility  of  the  living  thing  than  with  the  stability  and
invariance of the inert, closer to a transformative process, in itself absolutely indivisible
and not fragmentable, than to the identification of bundles of characteristics.
23 Physical matter as a network of relationships will in the end be replaced by what for
Merleau-Ponty is flesh (chair), a notion which guarantees the simultaneous presence of a
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flux of consciousness and matter, of subjective and objective existence, as happens in the
famous example, proposed by Merleau-Ponty but in fact taken from Husserl himself, of
the phenomenon of the hand touching and being touched. Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty the
thing is flesh, and not simply body: that is, not simple extension or bodily surface covered
by determined qualities; similarly, sensation is not mere reception of qualities, but vital
inherence; it does not offer inert qualities but active, dynamic properties endowed with
depth because they contribute to life. According Merleau-Ponty,
there  are  two ways  of  being  mistaken about  quality:  one  is  to  make it  into  an
element of consciousness, when in fact it is an object for consciousness, to treat it
as an incommunicable impression, whereas it always has a meaning; the other is to
think that this meaning and this object, at the level of quality, are fully developed
and determinate. (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002: 4)
24 And again:
The pure quale would be given to us only if the world were a spectacle and one’s
own body a mechanism with which some impartial mind made itself acquainted.
Sense experience, on the other hand, invests the quality with vital value, grasping it
first in its meaning for us, for that heavy mass which is our body, whence it comes
about that it always involves a reference to the body. (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002:
46)
25 This is a new, extremely radical form of anti-psychologism and anti-dualism, in which the
notions which emerge (feeling, flesh, friction, tendency) are characterized by a profound
and  constitutive  bilaterality  and  dynamism:  that  is,  a  structure  which  is  capable  of
maintaining the now foundational ideas of transformation, interweaving, co-penetration.
What is more, James himself was perfectly clear that the aim of radical empiricism is the
analysis of the complexity, not of consciousness nor or matter, but of the living thing,
when he states that
I am as confident as I am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking […] is
only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of
the  stream  of  my  breathing.  The  “I  think”  which  Kant  said  must  be  able  to
accompany all my objects, is the ‘I breathe’ which actually does accompany them […
]. Breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded,
the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them
as consciousness. (James 1907/96: 15-6)
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NOTES
1. This is the solution that can be found in Mill 1965. 
2. And not bilateral,  as in the case of  extension and colour;  it  is  in fact  possible to have an
experience without a thing, as in the case of feelings, or more generally of all non-intentional
experiences.
3. “The  dualism  connoted  by  such  double-barrelled  terms  as  ‘experience,’  ‘phenomenon,’
‘datum,’ ‘Vorfindung’ – terms which, in philosophy at any rate, tend more and more to replace the
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single-barrelled terms of  ‘thought’  and ‘thing’  –  that dualism, I  say,  is  still  preserved in this
account, but reinterpreted, so that, instead of being mysterious and elusive, it becomes verifiable
and concrete” (James 1907/96: 8).
4. “Experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness
and content comes, not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition” (James 1907/96: 8).
5. This idea is also present in Carnap 1921-26.
6. An another meaning of neutrality is revealed in the thesis of the ontological parity between
percepts and concepts, according to which we should not believe “that the merely thought-of
object is hid away inside of the thinking. The object of which I think, and of whose existence I
take cognizance without letting it now work upon my senses, occupies its definite place in the
outer world as much as does the object which Idirectly” (James 1907/96: 11). Thus, for James as
for Husserl, there is a clear distinction between thinking [Gedanke] and thought [Gedachtes]: “but
even were they centaurs and golden mountains, they still would be ‘off there,’ in fairy land, and
not ‘inside’ of ourselves” (James 1907/96: 11).
7. “Here as elsewhere the relations are of course experienced relations,  members of the same
originally chaotic manifold of non-perceptual experience of which the related terms themselves
are parts” (James 1907/96: 11n10). The topic of passing from chaos to structure is also present in
Carnap and in Mach. 
8. In this sense, it therefore seems legitimate to contrast the genetic-motivational nexus with the
causal nexus.
ABSTRACTS
Both  the  phenomenology  of  Husserl  and  the  pragmatist  phenomenology  of  James  can  be
categorized by the formula “radical empiricism,” which is explicit in James and implicit, but no
less pervasive, in Husserl. For both of them, radical empiricism is additionally conjoined with an
equally radical anti-psychologism. The problem is that the two terms “radical empiricism” and
“anti-psychologism” take on a radically different meaning in the two authors. This essay aims to
investigate the structural differences between two perspectives that, while following completely
different courses, seem to share the same objective: to elaborate a philosophy which at no point
moves away from the experiential plane. 
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